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1 INTRODUCTION
This paper examines some recent contributions to the economic policy of
a democratic government. In sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 I summarise papers by
Laurence Harris, Veil a Pillay, Robert Davies and Alec Erwin. In later
sections I develop certain criticisms of these papers.
2 LAURENCE HARRIS: A MIXED ECONOMY ORIENTED TOWARDS
SOCIALISM1
Harris examines the issues which face the ANC in its attempts to develop
a mixed economy 'oriented towards socialism'. He lists three criteria for
distinguishing between different kinds of mixed economy: which social
classes hold economic power; how investible surplus is used; the extent of
the economy's independence of the world market. I shall return to his notion
of a relatively autonomous economy later in the paper.
He notes the ANC's commitment to 'the twin objectives of redistribution
and high economic growth' (p.3) and his proposals seek to realise these
aims. He believes that it is essential to change the role of South Africa's
large public sector,
A democratic government may, he states, wish to control the 'commanding
heights' . Harris elucidates the term 'commanding heights' in terms of
three distinctive features of such industries. First, particular industries
produce goods which are fundamental 'material inputs for industrial
development' (p.5). Second, certain institutions (banks, mining finance
houses) play a major role in investment in the economy. Third, any industry
which plays an important role In employment is also a candidate for
nationalization because labour practices are central to apartheid.
Harris recognises that the amount of state ownership is only one aspect of
a mixed economy and its operation. He briefly discusses the issue of
whether publicly owned firms are less efficient than privately owned ones
and disputes the contention that they are. He accepts that the argument
that publicly owned firms are less profitable is more plausible. His
unconvincing answer to this problem is to note that profitability is often a
poor measure of efficiency: 'efficiency is not a neutral technical measure'
(p. 8); profitability may merely reflect repressive controls on labour. I shall
return to this point in the critical sections of this paper.
1
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\Harris then tackles the matter of the costs of nationalization. He concludes,
'If nationalisation is desirable, its financial implications, too, can be tackled.'
(p.9). I am doubtful about this claim and shall examine it later.
Harris recognises that the mixed economy will need to include a
'substantial private sector1 and he notes that the private sector tends to
have greater 'qualities of flexibility' than does the public sector. In his
view, 'the roles of the market, regulation, and planning are much more
important than the degree of state ownership.' (p.10)
How then should the state regulate the economy in order to 'overturn the
legacy of apartheid* (p.11)? First, he believes that the labour practices of
firms and minimum wages should be regulated. Second, the state will need
to control specific key prices: the price of maize, the exchange rate of the
currency and Interest rates. The control of exchange and interest rates
would allow the state to direct and influence the direction of economic
development. He contends that financial Institutions will probably
systematically evade these controls and nationalization may prove to be
necessary. Third, the state budget will assume 'a major role in controlling
the mixed economy.1 (p.15). In sum, the framework Harris advocates gives
the state responsibility for the 'overall direction of accumulation* but
leaves most prices to market forces.
Harris's contribution to the debate is, in my view, statist and over optimistic
about the ability of a democratized state to overcome opposition and fund
its policies. These points will be developed in the critical sections of this
paper.
3 VELLA PILLAY'S RESPONSE TO HARRIS'S PAPER2
My summary of this paper is selective. Pillay's paper is concerned with two
basic questions: the nature of the economy which will be inherited by a
democratic government and the relations of power during the transition to
democracy. On the nature of the economy, Pillay refers to the dominance
of the mining industry, the dependence on foreign investment and so on as
evidence that the South African economy exhibits 'significant elements of
dependency' (p.3).
Pillay is far more concerned with the possibility of capital and skill flight
and problems like the collapse of the currency. This leads him to a brief
analysis of the possible characteristics of the transition; he claims that a
'stand-off' is the most likely situation.
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Pillay then considers the 'preferred outcomes' in the 'social and economic
orders' in the early stages of democracy. He discusses the policies needed
to achieve these goals which include enough food, shelter, social security,
medical facilities, unemployment benefits, free and equal education and an
improvement in the working conditions and power of workers. State social
expenditure will have to grow 'considerably* as a proportion of national
output. Overall state policy will have to be 'substantially more
interventionist and redistributionary', top marginal tax rates may have to be
extremely high, nationalization of 'the more profitable sectors of the
economy* may be necessary and, of course, economic growth is essential.
Pillay states that the key problem for a democratic government will be the
opposition of the National Party government and the conglomerates. The
initial aim of a democratic government will, therefore, be to win and
consolidate political power.
Pillay discusses nationalization. He believes that, despite the 'mixed
experience* of nationalization, such policies have not been 'entirely
negative* (p.9). He contends that the power of the conglomerates is a
strong argument for nationalization. However, Pillay counsels caution: the
conglomerates have the power to undermine a democratic government.
Instead, an anti-monopoly and anti-trust policy may be an effective means
to control the power of the conglomerates.
Pillay's caution on nationalization is manifest again when he discusses the
financial system. He states that an alternative to nationalization of the
banking and credit system is for the state to create a set of financial
institutions under its control; these would then compete with the privately
owned institutions.
Pillay, like Harris, has a very statist conception of the role of a democratic
state. This is evident in his comment about the need for a democratic
government to confront difficult choices if it is to steer the economy 'in a
predetermined direction*.
4 VELLA PILLAY: THE WAY OUT OF SOUTH AFRICA'S CRISIS3
Pillay starts by outlining the key features of South Africa's economic crisis,
namely: economic stagnation, falling living standards (especially for black
people), chronically high inflation, a fiscal crisis (that is, great difficulty in
funding state expenditure programmes) and, finally, low levels of private
sector Investment.
The South African economy has been 'destabilised' by popular resistance
to apartheid. The 'way out' of the economic crisis Is, consequently,
integrally connected to meeting the basic needs of black people (see page
XXX above).
In Pillay's opinion the South African economy suffers from demand
constraints because of the poverty of black people. He advocates a 30% to
40% increase in the average wage of black people and a house-building
program of 1m houses p.a. These measures, he believes, will lead the
South African economy into economic growth.
The post-apartheid state will have to be interventionist. How will increased
state expenditure be funded? Pillay points to the huge savings which he
contends will result from the ending of wasteful apartheid expenditures. He
states, in addition, that the proposed large wage increases should be
funded from corporate profits and, perhaps, a freeze on white incomes 'for
a few years' (p.4).
Other policies will be required in Pillay's view. These will include: an anti-
monopoly programme, spreading ownership of industry to disperse power,
state influence on investment flows, and possible nationalization of
privatized parastatals to develop a socially useful 'service and industrial
infrastructure' and to assist in redistribution of wealth. Overall, Pillay
contends, the state will have to be more interventionist over a whole range
of issues including industrial and social policy.
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5 ROBERT DAVIES: DEALING WITH MONOPOLY CAPITAL4
The South African economy rests on two pillars; first, six conglomerates
(Anglo-American, Rembrandt, SA Mutual, Sanlam, Liberty Life, Anglovaal)
dominate the private economy; second, the state sector is large, accounting
for 29% of GDP in 1988.
A democratic state will be confronted by the great power of the
conglomerates. However, it would be an error to assume that the
conglomerates will be totally united against a democratic state.
What, Davies asks, is the fundamental strategic objective of ANC policy
towards the conglomerates? He describes briefly how the apartheid system
fails to meet 'even the most basic requirements of life* for the oppressed
(p.4). He states that a profound shift of both economic policy and the
nature of the economy is required to meet basic human needs and to allow
working people to play a part In the direction of the economy' (p.5)
The ANC, Davies notes, is committed to a mixed economy which would
allow private capital a 'considerable' role. He advocates the encouragement
of alternatives rather than 'restricting the scope for private capital/ (p.6).
Collective forms of enterprise will be required to prove themselves in
competition with private enterprise. However, at a later point, Davies
advocates the supervision and control of private capital. 1 shall return to
this contradiction in Davies's position in the critical sections of the paper.
How will the new forms of production be funded? Davies points to, first,
redistribution of wealth and, second, the need to ensure that 'a significant
proportion of investible surplus is made available to support a re-orientation
of production' (p.7).
A fundamental issue, Davies states, is about the extent to which the ANC
should accommodate to private capital and the extent to which it should
assert 'the interests of the people over capital.' (p.7). Another key problem
is the likely response of the conglomerates to ANC policy. It is necessary,
he claims, to identify areas of cooperation and agreement.
We now come to the most significant section of the paper. Rob outlines his
conception of the major aims of a democratic government. First, it it is
necessary to assemble the finance to support alternative forms of
enterprises. Second, a state planning body should channel a high
proportion of available surplus into selected projects. Third, the state
should 'aim to supervise and control the activities of private capital* (p.10).
Anyone who reads these points will be left in no doubt: Davies holds an
4
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exceptionally statist view of the desirable policy of a democratic
government despite his calls for greater worker involvement in enterprises.
Davies outlines a range of options for achieving these three aims. Most of
these options are complementary rather than exclusive. These include:
extensive nationalization without compensation, selective nationalization by
confiscation or using funds raised by various means, anti-trust policy, wider
representation on boards of large firms, and encouraging working class
action.
Davies ends by stating that, in his view, the conglomerates will be forced
to accommodate to some extent to ANC aspirations.
6 VELLA PILLAY'S RESPONSE TO DAVIES5
Pillay is concerned with two matters. First, he is sceptical of Davies' claim
that the conglomerates do accept that a democratic state would be
interventionist In his view, they may try to confine intervention to the
'second logic' economy of small black business, leaving the 'first logic1
economy of the big firms complete market freedom. It is essential, he
states, that the ANC analyze carefully which enterprises will be more and
less opposed to ANC policies.
Second, turns to Davies' attempt to reconcile the ANC's long-term
commitment to a mixed economy including a large state sector with its
promise to leave private capital considerable freedom. Pillay takes issue
with Davies' proposal that the emphasis should be on developing
alternatives to the existing enterprises. Pillay believes that it will be
essential to tackle the enormous 'monopoly' power early on, by breaking up
the conglomerates using anti-trust legislation.
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7 ALEC ERWIN: A DEMOCRATIC PLANNED ECONOMY6
Erwin states that poverty and unemployment can only be dealt with by 'a
planned reconstruction of the economy* (p.45). He identifies four crucial
issues for debate: the character of the economic crisis, the appropriateness
of free market solutions, whether a planned economy would be a solution
to the crisis, and whether a planned economy is actually feasible.
He refers to the first report (1988) of COSATU's Economic Trends project
which argued that there are 'substantial structural barriers to economic
growth' in South Africa.
He distinguishes between 'intensive' and 'extensive1 accumulation.
'Intensive* accumulation represents additional investment in existing
capacity to increase productivity and output. 'Extensive' accumulation is
investment in new capacity. A balance between these forms of
accumulation is desirable.
Capital, he states, is attempting to maintain profitability using intensive
accumulation: this increases unemployment. Furthermore, only large firms
can afford such investment and this increases the trend towards larger
conglomerates.
The Economic Trends report locates the major cause of the economic crisis
in South Africa's reliance on industrialization based upon migrant mine
labour and apartheid in manufacturing industries. As a result the
manufacturing sector is characterized by high costs and international
uncompetitiveness. Indeed, the reliance on cheap labour means that growth
based on the supply of cheap manufactured goods to the domestic market
is unlikely.
Erwin rejects both of the proposed capitalist solutions. The first advocates
a free market policy. Erwin is sceptical about the claim that this policy
would lead to lower prices of manufactured goods, greater international
competitiveness and an opening up of the low-income domestic market.
The second capitalist solution recommends 'inward industrialization' based
on a Keynesian form of state intervention. This strategy will fail because
the attempt to change key prices (for instance, the price of capital) will
rapidly confront the need to abridge the rights of private ownership, a path
which proponents would eschew.
Erwin asks whether a 'planned economy' can solve the crisis. He rejects
the notion of a command economy: it is successful at producing extensive
accumulation but fails to effectively achieve Intensive accumulation. The
consequence of such failure is low living standards. Furthermore,
6
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command structures destroy democratic control of production with severe
results of various kinds.
Erwin contends that a planned economy must address the need for both
intensive and extensive accumulation. Extensive accumulation will reduce
unemployment and produce basic products: it will entail economic
restructuring and 'constraints on private ownership' (p.47). He notes that
nationalization will not, of itself, be a solution. South Africa needs a variety
of ownership structures, a democratically based planning mechanism and
market forces. Market forces will 'facilitate intensive accumulation ... to
raise productivity and lower relative prices.' (p.47)
Finally, Erwin claims that a planned economy is feasible. South Africa is
rich in resources, has a 'developed productive capacity1 and has strong
community and worker-based democratic structures.
8 CRITICAL COMMENTS: INITIAL REMARKS7
The ANC is, like South Africa generally, at a turning point. It may soon be
governing South Africa: difficult choices have to be made; it is best that
they are made sooner rather than later.
My critical remarks reflect several concerns. First, wishful thinking of all
kinds must be avoided: planning and policies based on wishes have a
tendency to become nightmares for all involved. Second, I am deeply
sceptical about both the viability and desirability of statist economic
policies, especially schemes for large-scale nationalization. Indeed, given
the prevailing political and economic constraints, a largely market-led mixed
economy is inevitable. Third, it is essential to reflect about opportunities
for the development of small-scale grass-roots projects to enable
communities to take, at least, some control over their lives. It is not enough
to democratise the central state or even regional government.
7
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I shall discuss, in successive sections: the economic and political realities
which face the ANC; ownership and markets; profits in the mixed economy;
costing expenditure proposals; inflation and bankruptcy; and, finally,
policies to democratize the economy and encourage the development of
non-racial practices.
9 ECONOMIC POLICY: REALITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
Our analysis of the economic and political realities must be sober. First, the
scale of misery among black people is simply immense but South Africa is
not a rich country. Consequently solutions to even urgent, basic problems
(for instance, shelter and a decent diet for all) cannot be achieved in the
space of a few years.
Second, redistribution of wealth, income and opportunities are rightly
central to ANC strategy. However, if radical policies for an immediate and
large-scale extension of public ownership and dramatic redistribution of
wealth and income are put into effect, they will cause severe problems of
skill and capital flight. Drastic controls on capital movements will be a
disastrous response to potential or actual capital flight: South Africa's
access to crucial overseas export markets and to capital inflows will be
jeopardised. Acceptance of a mixed economy entails acceptance that
market processes cannot be directed and controlled in the manner that
Pillay, Davies and Harris all (although, in different ways) advocate.
Third, every proposal for further public ownership, higher wages or for
increased public spending must be rigorously costed. however justified any
particular suggestion may be in principle. We cannot achieve all our goals
in the immediate future following the transition to democracy. Anyone who
has read Francis Wilson and Mamphela Ramphele's Uprooting Poverty8
could never believe that even material poverty (let alone its psychological
and political accompaniments) in South Africa can be completely abolished
in, say, a dozen years.
Fourth, and this follows from what I have just written, when formulating
goals one has to establish priorities and distinguish stages and identify
what can realistically be achieved in each stage. And, it is not adequate to
plan on the basis of 'best^case' developments; provision must be made for
'worst case* developments in relation to overall policy and individual policy
initiatives. Furthermore it is crucial that, while the ANC may wish to achieve
certain aims at each stage, it must not encourage unrealistic expectations
amongst its members and supporters. Only so much can be achieved at
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any time. The ANC should constantly remind its people that every decision
to spend on one project is at the same time a decision not to spend on
another. The ANC, therefore, requires clear priorities and these will be
understood and supported only if they are democratically and widely
debated. If things go wrong, supporters are more likely to be patient if one
adopts a hard-headed strategy of this sort.
10 OWNERSHIP AND MARKETS
Harris's 'The Mixed Economy of a Democratic South Africa' has had a
major impact on ANC economic thinking. Like Pillay, Davies and Erwin,
Harris recognizes that 'public ownership is not a panacea1 (p.10) yet, all
the same, he argues that large-scale nationalization is probably necessary.
The grounds for his preferences are, to a large degree, first, that such
nationalization will give the democratic state the power to control the
direction of the economy and, second, that nationalization will change the
behaviour of enterprises. I am sceptical on both counts.
Is Harris correct in claiming that nationalization will represent a transfer of
power from Capital to the democratic state? The notion is that if one seizes
these positions Capital will lose a certain amount of power and the
democratic state will gain correspondingly. The implicit assumption of his
paper, and of many other left-wing economists, is that economic power is
located in particular places. But is this assumption credible? I very much
doubt it. First, market power is not a static property which can be
transferred by a change of ownership. Such market power as any firm
appears to have is always at risk: it is threatened by competitors, changes
in technology, the whims of consumers, loss of raw material sources,
political changes, variations in the effectiveness of organization and the
management team, the loss of strategic skills and so on. How can anyone
assume that a democratic government will be able to take over all these,
frequently intangible, features by buying out shareholders? To put it
differently, buying out previous shareholders is no guarantee that one will
inherit what previously existed. The owners of Capital will adopt various
strategies to protect their positions: they will move funds beyond the reach
of the South African government, key personnel will leave or resist the new
situation in many ways (and how will the ANC replace these individuals?),
the massive funds paid to previous owners will be used in other activities,
and so on. The democratic state will, very probably, in some cases inherit
virtual shells at great cost to the taxpayer and the opportunity cost will be
other valuable projects foregone. In other words, power cannot easily be
seized; it so easily dissolves in one's hands, leaving one with little but
frustration and a declining economy.
What about Harris's second ground for nationalization, namely, that it will
change the behaviour of firms? I shall develop my arguments in relation to
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financial markets because it is with these that I am most familiar. Harris's
proposals for the banks and financial institutions assume that public control
will enable the state to change the way firms operate: there will be a shift
away from the mere pursuit of capital accumulation in the direction of a
balanced search for economic and social development. How convincing is
this idea?
I assume that a democratic South Africa will have a relatively open economy
because this will be essential to attract foreign investment and to sell South
African exports abroad. Indeed, as a general rule, even firms oriented
wholly or largely to the domestic market will gain from relatively free
competition because it will force them to become more efficient and
productive. Even if the ANC or any conceivable democratic government is
not convinced by these arguments, the Western powers, the conglomerates
and the present state have and will use the power to insist on this outcome.
Publicly owned financial institutions will be subject to exactly the same
market constraints as are private enterprises. For example, they will pay
and charge prevailing market interest rates on the wholesale capital
markets. Now, of course, one can run publicly owned financial institutions
for use not profit but if all are so directed, the implication is that one
important sector of the economy will make little or no contribution to the
production of investible surplus. It is hardly necessary to state that this will
have an effect on prospects for economic growth. If, however, publicly
owned institutions are expected to pursue profits, how will their operations
differ from those of privately owned firms? Returning to the matter of
power, how much more control will the democratic state have over the
character of financial processes, if the financial institutions are nationalized,
than it does now? It is essential that advocates of nationalization provide
a very clear answer to this question. Finally, it must be emphasised that my
arguments do not preclude a measure of new public ownership, perhaps in
partnership with privately owned institutions, which is directed to social
goals, but only if these goals cannot be otherwise achieved.
Davies and Harris are favourable to a wide extension of public ownership
in an economy already characterised by a very large state sector. There are
many good arguments against a wide extension and these are somewhat
neglected. First, nationalization without compensation is quite out of the
question: it will lead to enormous disruption and possibly even civil war.
Nationalization will, consequently, have to be funded in one way or another.
The notion that one can pay former owners in interest bearing state bonds
(suggested as an option by Harris) must be resisted. Private capital will not
continue to cooperate under onerous conditions of this kind. Consequently,
nationalization will have to be paid for at the expense of other possibilities
foregone. The case for widespread nationalization on the grounds that it
will lead to a critical shift of power is, as I noted above, shaky but once one
realises how expensive it will be to nationalize large, profitable firms, then
it is difficult to understand why these proposals are so popular.
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Let me state my argument in the form of a general rule: buying out
shareholders in profitable and important firms will be expensive and should
only take place if/ in each case, it can be demonstrated that there are
decisive grounds in favour.
There is a further reason for caution, not to say opposition, to proposals for
a big extension of public ownership. Overall publicly owned firms will have
to make profits to fund investment, both their own and (through taxation)
other investment. Many South African products are already uncompetitive
in international markets. Publicly owned firms will face exactly the same
market constraints as the presently privately owned enterprises. Indeed, the
situation has been exacerbated by the opening up of much of Eastern
Europe to markets and private enterprise - competition from these low
wage economies may be very stiff in coming years. Given this context, are
there any good reasons to disrupt an already strained economy in favour
of, to say the least, policies with uncertain and possibly disastrous effects?
Harris, Pillay and Davies are all unwilling to accept the implications of a
commitment to a mixed economy. Each claims to accept that private capital
will have a legitimate role and a wide-ranging autonomy. However, each
writer hedges these concessions around with substantial restrictions. In
practice none of them appears to be willing to accept the autonomous role
of private capital which they claim is necessary. Harris believes the state
should have responsibility for the 'overall direction of accumulation1 while
allowing most prices to be set by market forces. In practice, it would
appear that nationalization will be the inevitable response if private capital
does not follow where the state wishes to lead. To what extent is Harris
prepared to allow investment to be allocated on the basis of market prices?
Not to a very great extent it would seem. Davies refers to the need to
'supervise and control' private capital while elsewhere in the paper
advocating the encouragement of public sector alternatives to private
capital rather than nationalization9 The overall tone of the paper (see
section 6) above) leaves me in little doubt that the emphasis will be on
control of private capital. Pillay10, in his comment on Harris's paper, writes
about the state steering the economy 'in a predetermined direction*. Each
writer adopts a statist position, that is, one which gives the state the
primary role with private capital in a subordinate position.11
9
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 Erwin's position (see section 7 above) is difficult to judge. However, he appears
to be far more concerned than the other three writers discussed to insist on the
dangers of planning without markets and democratic involvement.
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My view on this is quite simple: a mixed economy is one in which there is
state intervention but this intervention is kept strictly under control. This
means that to a large degree market forces, except where they are creating
major problems, should be allowed to operate. Major problems which might
justify state intervention include severe environmental damage, the collapse
of a large firm or plant with the danger of large-scale redundancies and so
on. Normally, however, as long as an enterprise obeys the laws of the land,
it should be free to operate in pursuit of profit. Acceptance of market forces
means a willingness to work with private firms rather than a wish to control
or direct them. The ANC has to decide which route it is to follow: statism
or a genuine mixed economy.
11 PLANNING
Each of the writers with whom we are concerned (Harris, Pillay, Davies and
Erwin) has enormous confidence in the effectiveness of the kind of planning
he advocates. I find it difficult to be sanguine about the predictability of the
consequences of planning. State intervention in the functioning and/or
consequences of market processes is often necessary and frequently
relatively successful. However, a few words of caution are in order. State
intervention can have effects altogether different from those intended. Let
me provide an example from the development of financial markets,
specifically the international capital markets known as 'euromarkets'.12
Euromarkets have their origin in the fact that participants in capital markets
wished to escape regulation, particularly by the United States authorities.
Indeed, these new markets developed so rapidly because they allowed
participants to escape much of the regulation to which financial markets
were normally subject (not just in the US but in other countries too,
including the United Kingdom). This, in essence, is the story of the origins
of the euromarkets. For a long time, the USA exerted tight controls on
maximum interest rates (Regulation Q) and on foreign access to US capital
markets (Interest Equalization Tax). Banks in Europe were able to offer
higher rates of interest to holders of dollars than were those in the USA and
(euro)dollars were therefore increasingly deposited with them. Borrowers
of (euro)dollars were able to gain access to dollars which were not subject
to Interest Equalization Tax. Therefore, a whole new set of financial markets
and institutions, of great international significance, have developed as a
direct consequence of acts - with different goals to those achieved - of
US regulators.
The lesson of this example - If, as I believe is the case, it can be
generalized - is that we should not depend too much on the effectiveness
121 am interested in the response of individuals present at the seminar about the
extent to which this lesson can be generalized.
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of planning initiatives. These comments must not, however, be treated as
arguments for free markets with only minimal regulation. Examples of
planning gone wrong can be matched, no doubt, with other (equally
convincing) instances of markets which fail to meet all sorts of basic human
needs.
12 PROFITS
Acceptance of a mixed economy is Inextricably connected to giving a high
priority to profitability as a key measure of economic success. Here I am
concerned with Harris's unsatisfactory response to this problem. He states
that it is true that there is a case for arguing that private firms are more
profitable than publicly owned firms. But lest this be thought of as an
argument against large-scale nationalization, he states immediately that
profitability Is often a poor measure of efficiency. The reason is that profits
may be high, productivity good but wages low as a result of repression.
This may be true but it is not really an answer to the problem of the lower
level of profits in many publicly owned firms than in comparable private
firms.
This thorny issue cannot be avoided. Profits do matter; this is true whether
we are referring to private or publicly owned firms. Profits are, despite
Harris's remarks, an important measure of success and a means to pay for
further projects13. The problem is that many publicly owned firms are
expected to pursue profits and social usefulness simultaneously. The ANC
must recognize that, to generate investment funds for investment and social
expenditure, South Africa needs public enterprises to be very profitable
indeed. Subsidies for carefully selected and socially useful projects will be
necessary but they must be funded from the profits of publicly owned as
well as (and not only of) private firms.
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13 COSTING EXPENDITURE PROPOSALS
Rigorous costing of all expenditure proposals, of whatever kind and
however justified in principle, is essential if scarce resources are to be used
wisely. My concern here is with Pillay's 'Some Problems of a Mixed
Economy in South Africa1 and 'The Crisis and the Way Out*. Pillay outlines
in both papers important but, all the same, very ambitious proposals to deal
with the living standards, environment and opportunities of the oppressed
majority. The problem is that in neither paper does he attempt to cost the
proposals. However, subsequently, in a paper for the Harare conference on
economic policy organized by the ANC, COSATU and other groups he did
attempt to estimate the quantities involved.14 I am not convinced by this
exercise for one simple reason: Pillay assumes that dismantling apartheid
will create enormous savings in the short-term. The problem is one does
not know whether this will be the case. In fact, the need to create new non-
racial structures and fund redundancy payments for staff who are no longer
needed or unwilling to work in the new structures may lead to increased
costs in the early years of democracy.
It must be emphasised that we cannot - as so many ANC members and
supporters appear to believe - achieve every urgent goal simultaneously:
deal with unemployment of between three and five million in the black
population, provide everyone with a living wage, house everyone in decent
if basic homes, give everyone access to social security and adequate
medical services, and provide free and equal education for all. Limited
resources require the ANC to cost each policy and the total package (and
do not assume a 'best case* development is inevitable), arrive at a clear
hierarchy of priorities, and distinguish between the short-term and long-
term. An ANC government cannot in the short term meet all basic needs.
Improvements will take time to achieve and will depend upon hard,
disciplined work and efficient use of scarce resources.
14
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March-April 1990.
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14 INFLATION AND BANKRUPTCY
Pillay is, quite correctly, deeply concerned about low wages. In 'The Crisis
and the Way Out', he advocates an immediate 30% to 40% Increase in
wages for black people. Nicoli Nattrass, in the same Supplement to The
Weekly Mail, counsels caution with respect to such proposals.15 She
refers to possible serious difficulties which may arise from strategies to
boost low wages:
'Boosting wages Is only a sensible strategy when growth Is
constrained by deficient demand for domestically produced goods or
for goods which could be produced domestically at short notice.'
Let us consider some possible implications of this kind of criticism for
Pillay's analysis in 'The Crisis and the Way Out*. Pillay contends that
higher wages plus a public housing program for 1m houses per annum will
lead South Africa into faster growth. The problem is that workers may
choose to spend their higher wages disproportionately on imported, and
often more competitive, foreign goods with resulting balance of payments
problems. There is a further danger which must be considered: massive
wage increases may fuel a surge in inflation which is already chronically
high; the lowest paid would probably suffer most from higher inflation.
Nattrass also remarks on what she characterizes as a failure of critics of
apartheid to confront the possibility that economic restructuring might lead
to bankruptcies. It is essential to examine Harris's, Pillay's, Davies's and
Erwin's proposals in the light of her remarks. There is a real possibility that
their proposals may raise rather than lower unemployment. Careful,
realistic research on this point is a matter of great urgency.
15 TOWARDS A NON-RACIAL AND MORE DEMOCRATIC ECONOMY
I shall conclude by listing a range of proposals that might help to achieve
the goal outlined in the above title. Each is an option short of large-scale
nationalization. My hope is that these kinds of proposals, if implemented
after careful study of their practicability in each case, may be helpful.
First, the kind of anti-monopoly policy suggested by Pillay and Davies may
be sensible in some cases. However, we must not reject out of hand the
warning of Dr Japie Jacobs (special adviser to the Minister of Finance) in
his speech at the Five Freedoms Forum conference on negotiations held in
Johannesburg in August 1990:
15
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'It is easy to conduct such an investigation [of barriers to competition
posed by conglomerates], but what do you do if you realise that you
will be inflicting damage on the economy instead of improving its
growth performance if you attempt to break up the
conglomerates?'16
Well, what does one do? This problem cannot be wished away on the basis
that conglomerate power is intrinsically dangerous.
Second, the government may wish to fund particular kinds of new
enterprises, some run on a non-commercial basis (for example, community
works programs to upgrade drainage, sewerage, water supply, roads) and
others on a commercial basis (for instance, a bank to fund small, potentially
viable co-operatives or informal enterprises. The non-commercial ventures
should be based on careful evaluation of needs and how effectively
available resources would be used; the commercial enterprises which are
funded should be evaluated by an actual or potential ability to become
genuine economic propositions. The stringent criteria suggested may
appear harsh but it must never be forgotten that wasteful use of resources
on certain selected projects denies others even the possibility of funding.
Third, in specific circumstances, there may be a good case for the state to
take partial equity stakes (as suggested by Harris) in important industries.
This is an expensive option and should only be used where there is no
cheaper alternative. Majority stakes should be avoided; the aim, when equity
stakes are purchased, should be to maintain a 'community' presence on
boards of particular corporations rather than to take them over.
Fourth, as advocated by Pillay, a 'Social Charter' should guarantee all
workers, on a non-racial basis, specific rights.
Fifth, a system of worker directors might be instituted in larger firms. This
would require systematic planning, pilot projects in sympathetic enterprises
and adequate training for the selected workers.
Sixth, the formal sector will not be able, at least for the foreseeable future,
to absorb the vast army of the employed and partly employed. The ANC
should aim to encourage grass-roots initiatives of various kinds: these
would help to improve living standards and allow the people involved a real,
albeit modest increase in the control they exercise over their lives and
environment. It is essential that democratization does not just involve
central, regional and local governmental institutions. The various levels of
government may wish to provide a framework to assist self-help schemes
but each should be ready to respond to ideas coming up from the
16
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community levels. Such initiatives will be expensive to fund - although
once again a hard-headed approach will be essential to encourage efficient
use of resources and the generation, if possible, of self-sustaining income
- and this is why South Africa will need dynamic and profitable
corporations, whether privately or public or publicly owned, to produce
sufficient surplus which can be recycled through the taxation and public
expenditure systems.
Seventh, redistribution of income, wealth and opportunities will be
necessary. No democratic South African government can adopt the 'leave
it to the free market' approach advocated by, for example, the Financial
Mail.17 A commitment to redistribution entails an agreed set of priorities
arising from public debate. Priorities should be matched with a profound
appreciation of what resources are likely to be available to the government.
As I have stated again and again, hard choices will have to be made: not
all goals can be pursued simultaneously. Thus, for Instance, if we prioritise
education we might have to provide less funds to, say, housing or health
care. Choices of this nature cannot be avoided.
The above suggestions will allow a democratic government to begin to
democratize the economy and the state, will encourage the dismantling of
racially based practices and will help us to create a less unequal society.
My fear is that Harris's and Davies's papers, by encouraging large-scale
nationalization and by going against the drift of international experience of
nationalization and planning will lead the ANC and any democratic
government into a statist Impasse. The result will, most probably, be an
over-centralized state and a stagnant economy.
17
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